Abstract
How does the distribution of individual preferences evolve as a result of marriage between individuals with different preferences? Could a family rule be self-enforcing given individual preferences, and remain such for several generations despite preference evolution? We show that it is in a couple’s common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of attention to their elderly parents if the couple’s preferences satisfy a certain condition, and the same condition is rationally expected to hold also where their children and respective spouses are concerned. Given uncertainty about who their children will marry, a couple’s expectations will reflect the probability distribution of preferences in the next generation. We show that, in any given generation, some couples may obey the rule in question and some may not. It is also possible that a couple will obey the rule, but their descendants will not for a number of generations, and then obey it again. In the long run, if matching is entirely random, either everybody obeys the same rule, or nobody obeys any. If matching is restricted to particular subpopulations identifiable by some visible trait, such as religion or color of the skin, different subpopulations may obey different rules. The policy implications are briefly discussed.
Highlights
The tenet underlying most of microeconomics until not very long ago was that rational individuals with given preferences and endowments optimize subject only to the law of the land
We show that the share of the young who comply with a family rule in any generation is determined simultaneously with the generation’s preference distribution
If ln βδL < ln w þ 1 < ln βδH, by contrast, condition (14) may hold, depending on the values of β, w, and δ* (which in turn depends on the initial distribution (1 − π, π) of δL and δH), and the family rule may emerge in the long run
Summary
The tenet underlying most of microeconomics until not very long ago was that rational individuals with given preferences and endowments optimize subject only to the law of the land. Assuming that married couples Nash-bargain over the allocation of their joint time and money endowments, and over the distribution of the marital surplus, this last article demonstrates that a young person whose preferences are compatible with the existence of a self-enforcing family rule requiring the young to give attention to their elderly parents will marry a young person of the opposite sex who holds the same preferences. We examine the opposite case where a person’s taste for filial attention is private information until a couple is formed In both cases, the focus is on cooperation between generations, rather than among members of the same generation as in other articles that will be mentioned later.. We review evidence that social policy crowds out family rules, and discuss the desirability of such a policy
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