Evolution of corporate governance in Russia: government policy vs. real incentives of economic agents

Abstract

This article is devoted to analysing the evolution of corporate governance mechanisms in Russia. Special attention is paid to the causes of dramatic discrepancies between the expected outputs of institutional reforms implemented by the Russian government with World Bank and IMF support and the actual behaviour of Russian companies. Why was the model of interaction between enterprises and investors, owners and managers, which had been successful in other countries, rejected by Russian business in the 1990s? And how can we evaluate certain positive changes that have occurred recently in corporate policies of major Russian companies? These questions are answered on the bases of analysis of economic agents' motivation at different stages of development of corporate structures in Russia. The article argues that the need for comprehensive organisational and technological restructuring of enterprises led to the need for a concentrated ownership structure. The formation of such a structure in the late 1990s (which occurred, in fact, contrary to the government's activities) created preconditions for extending the time horizon of dominant owners and managers and for positive qualitative changes in the relations between major Russian companies and their shareholders and investors.