Abstract
The phenomenon of individual disguise is pervasive in the real world. But in theory it is unclear what roles it plays in the evolution of cooperation. In this work we introduce individual disguise into a public goods game with pool punishment, and we assume that defectors choose to probabilistically disguise to escape punishment in interaction groups. By using the replicator equations, we show that the introduction of individual disguise hinders public cooperation in the conditions of low fine and low disguise cost no matter whether second-order punishment is considered or not. Besides, we find that the positive role of punishment is completely undermined in the absence of second-order punishment, whereas the situation is improved in the presence of second-order punishment.
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