Abstract
The evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the evolution of cooperation? To shed light on these questions, here, I consider a population of individuals who possibly play two consecutive rounds of public goods game, with different enhancement factors. Importantly, individuals have independent strategies in the two rounds. However, their strategy in the first round affects the game they play in the second round. I consider two different scenarios where either only first-round cooperators play a second public goods game, or both first-round cooperators and first-round defectors play a second public goods game, but in different groups. The first scenario can be considered a reward dilemma, and the second can be considered an assortative public goods game but with independent strategies of the individuals in the two rounds. Both models show cooperators can survive either in a fixed point or through different periodic orbits. Interestingly, due to the emergence of a correlation between the strategies of the individuals in the two rounds, individuals develop consistent personalities during the evolution. This, in turn, helps cooperation to flourish. These findings shed new light on the evolution of cooperation and show how consistent cooperative and defective personalities can evolve and play a positive role in solving social dilemmas.
Highlights
Regarding consistent personality differences in humans and animals, in different contexts, have been made[45]
In the first scenario, called a reward dilemma, while defection entails no more round of public goods game (PGG), cooperation in the first game leads to the entrance to a second PGG
Motivated by many pieces of evidence of assortative behavior[51,52], such as breaking or forming ties[53,54], I assume individuals are sorted based on their strategies in the first round, such that all the individuals who cooperate in the first round form a subgroup to play a PGG, and all those who defect in the first round form a different subgroup to play their second PGG
Summary
Regarding consistent personality differences in humans and animals, in different contexts, have been made[45]. In the first scenario, playing a second public good can be considered as a potential reward for cooperative behavior This scenario is motivated by the observations that in many contexts, cooperation serves as a signal of merit[9,37,38,47] or offers a high social s tatus[48–50] which can increase others’ willingness to interact with a cooperator. In the first scenario, called a (prosocial) reward dilemma, while defection entails no more round of PGG, cooperation in the first game leads to the entrance to a second PGG This scenario is consistent with a situation where cooperation serves as a signal of merit[9,37,38,47] or offers a high social status[48–50] which can increase others’ willingness to interact with a cooperator, and the individual is permitted to enter an elite PGG. The corresponding PGG can be considered an assortative PGG, in which individuals are sorted based on their strategy in the first round
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