Abstract

Research grounded in evolutionary theory holds the promise of explaining our moral intuitions in terms of the fitness benefits they conferred on our ancestors over time. This research suggests a view of morality as a set of reliably developing psychological instincts that are often universal, but not objective in the metaphysical sense. In this paper, I argue that this research may shed new light on the centuries-old debate surrounding natural law. By providing a scientifically plausible explanation for the moral intuitions at the heart of natural law theory, this research both (1) accounts for the emergence and persistence of the belief that a natural law exists, and (2) undermines one of the core tenants of natural law theory: that laws must necessarily give structure to our sense of morality.

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