Abstract
The quality and safety of nuclear power equipment requires the joint efforts of all enterprise members in the value chain. To solve the problem of untrustworthy quality supervision for nuclear power equipment in the cross-enterprise collaborative environment, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of manufacturers, constructors and supervisors was constructed. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and the dynamic interactive mechanism of behavioral decision-making of different enterprises were discussed. The impacts of such external factors as safety investment, inventory loss and penalty ratio on the evolution path of quality supervision behavior of enterprise members were verified with simulation analysis. The results point out that behavioral decision-making of enterprise members in the value chain is affected by multiple factors. Manufacturers should increase safety investment in production and operation, and constructors should decrease inventory loss. Besides, supervisors should establish reasonable policy and standards, strengthen the safety supervision of manufacturers and constructors, decrease regulation costs, and effectively ensure the quality and safety of nuclear power equipment.
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