Abstract
The legal challenges arising from the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem are widely discussed in legal theory. Less attention is given to the trial in the framework of political and moral philosophy, where the key focus remains on the nature and the origins of evil (without a doubt, fuelled by Hannah Arendt’s definition of banality of evil). However, the trail itself present equally challenging question of human response to evil: how are we, the members of the modern political locus to respond to the evil of inhuman proportions? This article aims to answer the question through the reconstruction of debate that took place during the period of the trail (from the date of capture of Eichmann in 1960, till his execution in 1962) and the arguments “for” and “against” the trial by Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Isaiah Berlin, Gershom Scholem and Martin Buber. Beyond these arguments, there is an engaging philosophical debate about the nature and origins of justice, the limits of guilt and retribution, crime and punishment. It is argued that Arendt’s pro-trail stance provide for a way of engagement with the questions of evil by modern political men.
Highlights
The legal challenges arising from the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem are widely discussed in legal theory
Less attention is given to the trial in the framework of political and moral philosophy, where the key focus remains on the nature and the origins of evil
The trail itself present challenging question of human response to evil: how are we, the members of the modern political locus to respond to the evil of inhuman proportions? This article aims to answer the question through the reconstruction of debate that took place during the period of the trail and the arguments “for” and “against” the trial by Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Isaiah Berlin, Gershom Scholem and Martin Buber
Summary
Teismo metu Schwartzbardas ne tik prisipažino padaręs nusikaltimą, bet ir teigė, kad būtų ir vėl tą padaręs, nerodė jokio atgailos ženklo ir teigė, jog vykdė teisingumą visų per pogromus nužudytų aukų vardu. Pasak Arendt, būtent žengęs žingsnį po žmogžudystės pasiduoti ir taip atskleisti pasauliui savo motyvus bei istoriją apie tai, kas buvo Simonas Petliura, S. Kaip teigia Arendt, „teisingumą ne tik reikia įvykdyti, bet ir rodyti, idant jis būtų įvykdytas“25. Politiškai svarbus aktas, kaip teisingumo siekis, pasak Arendt, turi neredukuojamą rizikos elementą būtent dėl šio savo intencijų atskleidimo kitiems[26]. Pavyzdžiui, Abba Kovneris, prisimindamas savo liudijimus teisme, rašo, jog teismo metu, prisimenant aukas, „įvyko kažkas išskirtinai mistiško mano gyvenime ir istorijoje, tai, kas negalėjo įvykti, kai aukų pelenai dar buvo karšti, bet įvyko dabar, jas prisimenant“. Nors modernios valstybės teisė nežino, kaip atsakyti į blogį ir jį absorbuoti į save, blogį, kuris transcendentinis jai pačiai, visgi teismą, kaip viešą pasirodymo, dialogo ir sprendimo erdvę, Arendt iš esmės mato kaip vienintelę tinkamą galimybę moderniam politiniam žmogui ieškoti santykio su tokiu blogiu
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