Abstract

This paper examines the role that lived experience plays in the human capacity to reason about uncertainty. Previous research shows that people are more likely to provide accurate responses in Bayesian tasks when the data are presented in natural frequencies, the problem in question describes a familiar event, and the values of the data are in line with beliefs. Precisely why these factors are important remains open to debate. We elucidate the issue in two ways. Firstly, we hypothesize that in a task that requires people to reason about conditional probabilities, they are more likely to respond accurately when the values of the problem reflect their own lived experience, than when they reflect the experience of the average participant. Secondly, to gain further understanding of the underlying reasoning process, we employ a novel interaction analysis method that tracks mouse movements in an interactive web application and applies transition analysis to model how the approach to reasoning differs depending on whether data are presented using percentages or natural frequencies. We find (1) that the closer the values of the data in the problem are to people's self-reported lived experience, the more likely they are to provide a correct answer, and (2) that the reasoning process employed when data are presented using natural frequencies is qualitatively different to that employed when data are presented using percentages. The results indicate that the benefits of natural frequency presentation are due to a clearer representation of the relationship between sets and that the prior humans acquire through experience has an overwhelming influence on their ability to reason about uncertainty.

Highlights

  • Over the past five decades, the human ability to reason about uncertainty has been the subject of a wealth of research

  • What is the probability that a woman with a positive mammography has breast cancer?

  • The context of the problem is different, the information provided in the fire-and-alarm scenario is similar to the information provided in the original mammography problem, i.e., they both include the base rate, the true positive rate and the false alarm rate

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Summary

Introduction

Over the past five decades, the human ability to reason about uncertainty has been the subject of a wealth of research. Of particular difficulty are problems where one is expected to use Bayes’ theorem (Equation 1) to estimate the probability of a hypothesis given the availability of certain evidence. These appear to be challenging for laypeople and for experts, such as medical professionals. The probability that a woman without breast cancer will have a positive mammography is 9.6%. What is the probability that a woman with a positive mammography has breast cancer?

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