Evicting and filling attack for linking multiple network addresses of Bitcoin nodes

Abstract

Bitcoin is a decentralized P2P cryptocurrency. It supports users to use pseudonyms instead of network addresses to send and receive transactions at the data layer, hiding users’ real network identities. Traditional transaction tracing attack cuts through the network layer to directly associate each transaction with the network address that issued it, thus revealing the sender’s network identity. But this attack can be mitigated by Bitcoin’s network layer privacy protections. Since Bitcoin protects the unlinkability of Bitcoin addresses and there may be a many-to-one relationship between addresses and nodes, transactions sent from the same node via different addresses are seen as coming from different nodes because attackers can only use addresses as node identifiers. In this paper, we proposed the evicting and filling attack to expose the correlations between addresses and cluster transactions sent from different addresses of the same node. The attack exploited the unisolation of Bitcoin’s incoming connection processing mechanism. In particular, an attacker can utilize the shared connection pool and deterministic connection eviction strategy to infer the correlation between incoming and evicting connections, as well as the correlation between releasing and filling connections. Based on inferred results, different addresses of the same node with these connections can be linked together, whether they are of the same or different network types. We designed a multi-step attack procedure, and set reasonable attack parameters through analyzing the factors that affect the attack efficiency and accuracy. We mounted this attack on both our self-run nodes and multi-address nodes in real Bitcoin network, achieving an average accuracy of 96.9% and 82%, respectively. Furthermore, we found that the attack is also applicable to Zcash, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dash. We analyzed the cost of network-wide attacks, the application scenario, and proposed countermeasures of this attack.