Event-triggered resilient control of a class of cyber-physical systems under denial-of-service

Abstract

A cyber-physical system (CPS) typically utilizes networks of computers and communication systems to automatically monitor and manage the interactions and data exchanges between plant, sensor, controller and actuator elements within the CPS. The design and implementation of such a CPS are particularly challenging due to their requirements of high reliability and resiliency to possible components' failure or external malicious attacks. This paper examines the stability of a class of CPS which consists of a linear plant with matched uncertainties and is subject to a communication system problem known as denial-of-service (DoS). In essence, a DoS is a failure phenomenon on the CPS' communication links which prevents the execution of ideal control inputs to take place. This paper proposes an event-triggered control update scheme to design a resilient controller for such a CPS and characterizes sufficient conditions under which the system is rendered globally asymptotically stable in the presence of DoS attacks.