Event-Triggered H∞ Filtering for Cyber–Physical Systems Against DoS Attacks

Abstract

This article mainly focuses on the problem of resilient <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$H_{\infty}$</tex-math> </inline-formula> filtering for cyber–physical systems (CPSs) subject to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and sensor saturation. A new event-triggered mechanism (ETM) considering both DoS attacks and limited network bandwidth is put forward to guarantee the secure performance of the filter. Under this mechanism, inherent periodical transmission attempts are generated during DoS active periods, by which the latest measurement output of the system can be successfully transmitted to the filter after the end of the DoS attack; while during DoS sleep periods, the ETM degenerates into a traditional one. Furthermore, a valid DoS attack model is proposed to further characterize the following two scenarios occurring between adjacent sampling instants: 1) the end of the DoS attack and 2) both the start of the DoS attack and the end of the DoS attack. Sufficient conditions for designing the secure filters of CPSs against DoS attacks are achieved by using the piecewise Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional approach. Finally, the validity of our designed approach is manifested by an illustration of quarter-vehicle suspension systems (SSs).