Event-Triggered Adaptive Optimal Fast Terminal Sliding Mode Control Under Denial-of-Service Attacks

Abstract

This article develops an event-based adaptive optimal fast terminal sliding mode control (AOFTSMC) under malicious denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. It is supposed that the transmitted measurement signals are ruined by attackers randomly. A key issue is how to design the controller parameters to keep the desirable performance of the closed-loop system under DoS attacks which are characterized by their frequencies and durations. To this end, the event-based AOFTSMC is proposed first to increase robustness against the attack and reduce the computational load. Then, an explicit effect of the duration and frequency of DoS attacks on the stability of the closed-loop systems under the presented controller is analyzed. Moreover, the scheduling of controller updating times is determined. This leads to derive the maximum bandwidth of the cyber layer which is required to guarantee the stability of the closed-loop system. Then, the designer can outline suitable controller parameters in different situations in the presence of uncertainties and DoS attacks. Finally, numerical simulation results illustrate the validation and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.