Evaluation on Passive System Identification and Covert Misappropriation Attacks in Large Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors

Abstract

The recent literature on nuclear science demonstrates the feasibility and the benefits of controlling large Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) through Networked Control Systems (NCS). However, the use of NCSs in PHWRs may also expose such critical systems to threats launched from the cyber domain. In the present paper, we propose a novel combination of two cyber-physical attacks (Passive System Identification attack and Covert Misappropriation attack) and evaluate their impact in a PHWR. The results indicate that, with this two attacks, the attacker is able to manipulate the power of the PHWR achieving, at the same time, a high degree of covertness. Moreover, the outcomes suggest the sensitivity and accuracy required for a monitoring system to detect this kind of attack, which may be considered in the development of standards and requirements for PHWR monitoring systems.