Abstract
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and their applications. Furthermore, there is a growing impetus to integrate IoT networks on a global scale, using satellites to expand the range of IoT connectivity into geographically remote areas. Ensuring the security of satellite backhaul for IoT networks is thus of paramount importance. The steady advance of quantum computing in recent years threatens to nullify classical cryptographic approaches based on assumptions of computational hardness, motivating the need for post-quantum cryptography. Quantum computing algorithms have been developed that, once a quantum computer of sufficient scale is realised, will be able to break classical cryptosystems efficiently (at polynomial-time complexity). A promising method of securing information against this threat at the physical layer has emerged in the form of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD exploits the fundamental physical properties of light to guarantee information-theoretic security. Research into the application and standardisation of QKD to secure satellite backhaul, however, is still in its infancy. This paper presents a brief overview of the theoretical basis for QKD, whilst also providing a survey of contemporary QKD protocols. It evaluates the ability of these protocols to secure satellite backhaul in the context of a typical satellite-IoT network architecture. Furthermore, it highlights the vulnerabilities, as well as the technical challenges associated with this endeavour. Finally, it proposes directions for future research and development into protocols and standardisation for the satellite-integrated IoT domain. Several challenges must be overcome before QKD can evolve into a global-scale solution for securing satellite-IoT. Secret key generation rate remains very low in practical demonstrations of trusted-relay QKD satellite architectures. Further research is needed to overcome or mitigate the fundamental rate-distance trade-off before satellite QKD can be considered practicable in an IoT application. Alternatives that do not rely on trusted nodes are contingent on nascent technologies such as quantum repeaters and quantum memory. Whilst in theory QKD provides perfect information-theoretic security, it remains vulnerable to attacks that exploit imperfections in real-world equipment. Further effort is needed to develop QKD protocols that can safeguard against the aforementioned challenges.
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