Evaluation of Potential to Air Ingestion From RWT Following RAS

Abstract

At the Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) when the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) water level decreased to a certain value following Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), the isolation valves of Containment Recirculation Sump (CRS) of the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plants (KSNP) are open automatically while the RWT isolation valves would be closed manually. It was concerned whether the design has a potential to air ingestion to Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps before completion of the manual action to close RWT isolation valves. To support the safety evaluation on this issue including the evaluation of design adequacy, an analysis of the hydraulic transient within the ECCS piping following the RAS in KSNP is performed. RELAP5/MOD3.3 code is used to calculate the transient behavior of the piping network. The code was known to have capability to calculate one-dimensional two-phase transient flow with noncondensible gas in the complex piping. Substantial portion of ECCS are modeled including RWT, CRS, each pipe line from RWT and CRS to connection point with its own isolation valve and check valve, a common pipe line to ECCS header, each pipe line from the header to High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump, Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump, and Containment Spray (CS) pump. Transient hydraulic behavior in the piping system following RAS after LOCA is calculated. It is found that the RWT water level was always higher than the elevation of the check valve at the connecting point by more than 15 ft. It indicates the air intrusion to the check valve can be sufficiently prevented by this amount of water head.