Evaluation methods of BDS-3 ground-segment defensive capability oriented to satellite navigation countermeasures

Abstract

Owing to intentional interference and destructions during satellite navigation countermeasures, the security application of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) faces immense challenges. To ensure the safe application of the GNSS in complex electromagnetic environment, the system-level defensive capability need be assessed, which can make for maintaining GNSS normal service during countering and further realizing the optimal decision. Therefore, this study used the ground control segment in the GNSS as the evaluation object, the bottom indices related to the criterion layers including service performance and station function as the key evaluation indices, and the technical requirement of each index under a secure situation as the standard, to propose the evaluation system including index system and evaluation methods for the ground-segment defensive capability. As BeiDou navigation satellite system III (BDS-3) is a global navigation satellite system independently built and operated by China, it was taken as a case for method verification. Then, BDS-3 two-way observation data between the satellite and the ground and between stations, which was collected from Beijing flight Control Center, from March 5 to 12 (2022) were selected during tests, and the results were compared with the existing standards contained in BDS open service performance standard to evaluate the system-level defensive capability. Evaluation Results of positioning accuracy and error correction ability for the BDS-3's ground stations determined through seven damage experiments with different interference strength show that: Corresponding horizontal and vertical positioning accuracy of stations under test did not exceed 1 m in the statistical period and their convergence time did not exceed the limit (30 min); thus, the ground segment of the BDS-3 has a good defensive capability. Compared to comprehensive evaluation results of the BDS-3, based on the theoretical threshold (the ground-segment threshold ≤48.40 % and the space-segment threshold ≤51.60 %), we know that its ground-segment defense (14.06 %) was worse than GPS ground-segment defense (14.43 %), whereas the ground-segment defense of the BDS/GPS integrated system (15.29 %) was best and its capability evaluation grade was strong. They indicate system's future improvements should focus more on enhancing the development scale and service efficiency of the BDS-3's ground stations in the Western Hemisphere, and reasonably promote system compatibility and interoperability while considering facility cost and operating efficiency.