Evaluating the Enforcement of the Decisions of WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Comply or Not to Comply Considerations

Abstract

This paper evaluate the structure for dispute adjudication under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS). An analysis of the legal nature of WTO obligations is carried out to ascertain how it influences members when deciding whether to comply or not with the outcome of a WTO dispute. The paper examines the two broad models from which scholars and even countries have tried to understand their WTO’s legal obligations. In addition, the paper make the case that in reality WTO obligations are the products of a hybrid of the two dominant models or theories. Further, it is posited that the analysis and evaluation of WTO DSS should be restructured taking into account that despite the legalization of the WTO DSS and its enforcement mechanism, it is constrained by international legal discourse and politics. Finally, there are suggestions on possible ways of improving the remedy system, which would effectively incentive countries to comply with their WTO obligations.