Evaluating the ecological and social targeting of a compensation scheme in Bangladesh.

Annabelle Jade Bladon,Liaquat Ali,Essam Yassin Mohammed,E J Milner-Gulland,Belayet Hossain,Golam Kibria,Iratxe Puebla

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0197809

Abstract

Conservation payments are increasingly advocated as a way to meet both social and ecological objectives, particularly in developing countries, but these payments often fail to reach the ‘right’ individuals. The Government of Bangladesh runs a food compensation scheme that aims to contribute to hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) conservation by improving the socioeconomic situation of households affected by hilsa sanctuary fishing bans. Analysing data from a household survey of compensation recipients and non-recipients, we identify the current correlates of compensation distribution and explore perceptions of fairness in this distribution. We find that distribution is largely spatial rather than based on the household characteristics that are supposed to determine eligibility for compensation, indicating political influence in the distribution process. We also find the compensation scheme is widely perceived to be unfair, which could be undermining its potential to compensate vulnerable fishers while improving compliance with fishing bans. The spatial distribution of compensation would shift substantially under alternative targeting scenarios that are likely to improve the cost-effectiveness of the scheme, such as targeting those who are most dependent on fishing for their livelihood. This study highlights a challenge for conservation payment schemes that aim to achieve the dual objectives of poverty reduction and ecological sustainability, particularly large-scale public schemes, and suggests that more effective targeting and transparency about the basis of payment distribution are prerequisites for schemes to be both cost-effective and socially acceptable.

Highlights

Monetary or in-kind payments are increasingly used in resource management and conservation as a way to incentivise behavioural change or compensate for losses incurred as a result of intervention [1,2,3]
We focus on a government-led compensation scheme for hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) fishing communities in Bangladesh
For households outside of Chandpur, living in a sanctuary area had a negative influence on compensation distribution–a result which reflects the fact that Chandpur is both a sanctuary area and has the highest compensation coverage of any district

Summary

Introduction

Monetary or in-kind payments are increasingly used in resource management and conservation as a way to incentivise behavioural change or compensate for losses incurred as a result of intervention [1,2,3]. Compensation payments aim to offset conservation costs, whereas incentive payments aim to change behaviour voluntarily and may have additional benefits; a conservation payment scheme may have one or both of these objectives. Ecological and social targeting of compensation www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ department-for-international-development) and the Darwin Initiative (https://www.gov.uk/government/ groups/the-darwin-initiative). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript

Objectives

Methods

Results

Discussion

Conclusion