Abstract

To date, most evaluations of the Accords negotiated between the Australian Coun cil of Trade Unions and the Labor government have been on the basis of perform ance indicators before and after the implementation of the agreements. The comparative approach with other economies of similar size and structure but different policy regimes has not been widely used. This paper attempts to demon strate, first, that the Canadian and Australian economies have sufficient structural similarities to make the comparative approach meaningful and, second, that the Accord policy framework has had limited impact on macroeconomic indicators, with one significant exception, the rate of employment growth, which has been consistently higher in Australia than in Canada. However, a prima facie case is also made for the argument that the social democratic Accord process of industrial and labour force restructuring has re sulted in a maintenance or strengthening of the social wage and social safety net in Australia, whereas in Canada, under a neo-liberal (or neo-conservative) pro gramme, the social wage and social programmes have been under continuous and sustained attack. 1. However, for Australia-New Zealand comparisons, see Easton and Gerritsen, 1995, and Keizer and Muysken, 1995. Although not intended as an evaluation of the Accords, Australia Reconstructed (Australian Council of Trade Unions/Trade Development Council, 1987) includes fairly comprehensive comparisons of the Australian economy and policies with those of Austria, Norway, Sweden, West Germany and the United Kingdom from the 1960s to 1986. The Accord period covered is too short, however, for any significant evaluation. On the other hand, there have been a number of comparative studies of industrial relations systems. Of particular relevance here, see Reid, 1993; Gilson, 1991a, Gilson, 1991b; McCalman, 1992; and Dowrick, 1993. 2. This summary is taken from Stilwell, 1991, except for the year 1993, which is the author's summary of the main points in Putting Jobs First (Australian Council of Trade Unions, 1993a). 3. Other criteria for comparative analysis, such as regional proximity and shared history can be, and have been, used. See, for example, Easton and Gerritsen, 1995, for an Australia-New Zealand comparative analysis of economic policy and macroeconomic performance under Labor governments. 4. The Australian system is frequently referred to as 'centralized' because of the pivotal role of the federal Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. However, as Dabscheck points out, the commission in the recent period oscillated between centralized decision making based on wage indexation (1975-81), decentralization (1981-82), and centrali zation in the form of a wage freeze (1982-83), followed by wage indexation under the Accord Mark I. Subsequently, in the 1991 National Wage Case, the commission again moved toward decentralization with the acceptance of enterprise bargaining (Dabscheck, 1989, pp. 28-40). 5. In fact, the most serious attack in transfers and social programmes in Canada has come in the 1995 budget of the Liberal government, which replaced the Conservatives in 1993. Given these drastic cutbacks, we would expect a substantial acceleration in the deterioration of Canada's performance relative to that of Australia after 1995. In this respect the Liberals have proved more neo-liberal than the ostensibly more right-wing Conservatives. 7. The use of the term 'social democratic' to describe the Australian (Labor) Accord model is open to criticism, particularly given Labor's companion neo-liberal policies of deregulation of capital, financial and international trade markets. In correspondence with the author, John King suggests that the term (European) Christian Democratic might be a more appropriate designation of Labor's approach. However, it is perhaps more in keeping with conventional views to continue to refer to Labor's approach as social democratic to differentiate it from the neo-conservative (or neo-liberal) approach of the Canadian and Australian liberal and conservative parties.

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