Abstract

Piaget’s infancy books are examined in the light of an emerging climate of thinking about minds as loosely coupling and historically conditioned networks of mental agencies. The analysis is focussed on Piaget’s work on prehension. We provide reasons for suggesting that (1) Piaget changed how he observed his infants in ways which anticipated this present climate; (2) Piaget did not develop such views fully, in part, because of his commitment to ideas about stages of invariant mental progress, and (3) Piaget’s observations provide an especially apt base from which to develop such views of human mental origins.

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