Evaluating Hungary's Mixed‐Member Electoral System

Abstract

Abstract The electoral system adopted by Hungary in 1989 represents a monument to the potential for institutional design through bargaining to produce complex yet stable institutions. The key compromise reached during this bargaining process was the decision to use a mixed‐member system, electing a roughly even number of representatives from both majoritarian single‐seat districts (SSDs) and from multi‐seat, list proportional representation (PR) districts. This decision established Eastern Europe's first mixed‐member electoral system, a format that was to become common in post‐communist electoral systems. In its ten‐year existence, Hungary's mixed‐member system has operated in three elections and seen three different governments come to power. Evaluates the consequences among the electorate of the institutional choice of the mixed‐member system, the consequences for political parties, the role of the electoral system in Hungary's contemporary national politics and political system, discussing its perception by both elites and voters, and finally pointing to its long‐term prospects.