Euroscepticism and the European parliament: The mutual legitimization paradox

Abstract

The European continent is moving away from a long-term tacit consensus on the desirability of deepening of European integration and entering a period of uncertainty and turbulence. The rise of the Euroskeptics on the European political scene creates without a doubt a discomfort among pro-European political forces. This prevents the democratic capacity of this process to be perceived, and in particular, the contribution of Euroscepticism channeled in the European Parliament, since it is the only organized political opposition in the EU institutional order which in terms of procedure leaves little room for that. Political movements and parties that express doubts about the benefits of the EU are certainly gaining legitimization by entering the European Parliament. However, on the other hand, this may have one unintended consequence. They contribute to the democratic legitimization and the reduction of the democratic deficit of the institution which they more or less radically challenge. They do so in the context of limited legitimization conferred to the European Parliament within the institutional structure of the EU. At first glance, the paradox of Euroscepticism being a threat to the EU and at the same time of reducing its democratic deficit is explained in this paper by the use of the German Federal Constitutional Court expressed in the famous judgment on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon. In addition to normative considerations, the paper also contains a shorter political review on the rise of Euroscepticism and its perspective. The author concludes that a conditional mutual legitimization of Euroscepticism and the European Parliament is emerging as a new political reality.