Europeanising Antitrust: British Competition Policy Reform and Member State Convergence

Abstract

This article argues that the patterns of competition policy convergence in EU member states challenge formulations of the process of Europeanisation and specifically the notion that the likelihood of policy harmonisation is a function of the pre-existing compatibility or ‘fit’ between national and supranational policies. In the case of antitrust, the member states in which existing arrangements were least compatible with the European policy were generally the first to adopt the European competition enforcement regime, while Britain, in spite of having an established—albeit dysfunctional—competition regime since the 1940s, was the last of the medium- and large-sized members to move towards harmonising its antitrust rules. The article finds that the pre-existence of an antitrust system actually made harmonisation more difficult for Britain by allowing British industrial interests to develop preferences for the domestic system, which stymied attempts to Europeanise British policy.