European Union regulatory politics in the shadow of the WTO: WTO rules as frame of reference and rhetorical device

Abstract

This contribution asks how the World Trade Organization (WTO) affects European Union (EU) regulatory politics. While WTO rules have no direct effect, authors who take a rational choice institutionalist perspective argue that these rules are enforced domestically through the mobilization of exporters triggered by the WTO dispute settlement system. This contribution challenges the plausibility of this argument and offers an alternative perspective rooted in historical and discursive institutionalism. It contends that WTO rules act as both a frame of reference influencing actors' perceptions of the scope of legitimate policy outcomes and as a rhetorical device that may be used by actors in domestic political battles over regulatory policy decisions. Two recent decisions on EU regulation with international trade effects are process-traced to demonstrate the value of the alternative perspective against the rational choice institutionalism model: Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) and the proposed ‘carbon border tax’ in the framework of the EU emissions trading scheme post-2013.