Abstract
This paper analyzes the underexplored relationship between European Union agencies (EUAs) and the member states. It is argued that the vertical link constitutes a hitherto unexplored source of political accountability for EUAs. In particular, member states’ representation on the EUAs’ management boards (MBs) can be considered as an instance of vertical political accountability and, therefore, also as a possible substitute for input legitimacy — a feature EUAs are conventionally seen to be lacking. However, drawing on document analysis and survey data, the empirical results reveal a rather ambivalent picture of MBs’ vertical political accountability. The strong vertical political accountability relationships expected are only present for one EUA out of six. It can also be shown that more powerful EUAs are not held more accountable than less powerful ones.
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