European solidarity and multi-speed integration: Results of a laboratory experiment

Abstract

The conflict around grain and flour imports from Ukraine to the European Union, which made the interests of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia contradict the interests of the majority of member states, and which was taking place having mass farmers’ protests in the background, invites revisiting European solidarity. Any political decision adopted on the EU level by voting of all member states indicates solidarity among them. Authors of this article, however, suggest distinguishing between two types of solidarity, namely the solidarity of the majority with the minority, and the solidarity of the minority with the majority. Game theory provided with the means allowing suggesting the behavioral matrix, which helps distinguishing between the two types of solidarity. Negotiations preceding formal voting help achieving solidarity of both types; those negotiations can be bilateral or multilateral.The results of the experiment staged, again, with the help of game theory demonstrate that solidarity with the majority emerges more often after bilateral negotiations, while solidarity with the minority emerges more often after multilateral negotiations. That conclusion allows recommending choosing the format of negotiations depending on the expected outcome of consequent voting. Based on the experience of the European Union, that recommendation is applicable to all cases of regional integration, first of all, to the Eurasian Economic Union. It also helps explaining why despite the mounting number of the demands for solidarity that the majority of EU member states places on the minority, the latter fails to consolidate and thus to endanger the future of the entire European integration project.