Abstract

This chapter engages with two interrelated questions: First, what is the function of the European Union (EU) institutions within the European Banking Union (EBU)’s normative and institutional framework? Second, what impact does the EBU have on the EU’s institutions? It analyses the balance of power horizontally (amongst EU bodies) and vertically (between Union and national actors) within the supervisory and resolution pillars. It argues that the EBU’s design results overall in the fragmentation of executive power. Moreover, whilst the EBU’s new institutional equilibrium is shaped primarily by the Union legislator, the emerging jurisprudence of Union courts plays its own distinct role in influencing the allocation of powers, which often works in favour of the European Central Bank (ECB). The debate on the appropriate kind and degree of accountability of the ECB in its supervisory capacity requires careful consideration of the scope and efficiency of all available administrative, political and judicial accountability mechanisms.

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