European Affiliations or National Interests? Analyses of Voting Patterns on Trade Policy in European Parliament

Abstract

This paper reviews changes in role of European Parliament (EP) in EU’s trade policy since the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty brought about important changes in EU governance, and in particular, strengthening of the role of the EP. EP’s competences in trade policy were also strengthened. All trade agreements with third countries require a consent from the EP in the ratification procedure and all trade-related legislations must be jointly decided by the Council and the EP.This paper examines the determinants of voting patterns for EU’s trade legislations including EU’s Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Korea and Colombia/Peru. The results confirm that Members of European Parliaments (MEP) still tend to vote with others in their political groups in trade legislations and their voting pattern is not very different from the previous pattern. This trend is confirmed by both the comparison of intra-voting cohesion index and the empirical test based on the probit model. Country-specific variables do not explain well the voting behavior of MEPs. However, it is noteworthy that some MEPs voted in line with their national interests in case of Korea-EU FTA.It is expected that influences of the EP on EU’s trade policy would increase over time, as MEPs realize their new powers and learn how to use it to reflect their opinion on EU’s trade agenda. As the EU expands its FTAs to the United States and Japan, much larger trade partner than the EU ever negotiated, more active involvements from the EP are expected. This means that various interest groups, such as trade associations and NGOs will attempt to exert greater influence on the European Parliament as well as the European Commission.