Europe: The Partial Partner

Abstract

I American-European relations may now best be described as a partnership-a character- ization that suggests the currently protean quality of Atlantic ties. Partial may mean favoring or inclined to favor one party over another; or it may signify a part of a greater whole; or it may simply convey the sense of something that is not general or total, something incomplete or otherwise disengaged. The term partner, similarly, implies several gradations of alliance cohesion, ranging from silent and grudging partnership to visible and active coopera- tion. These distinctions are useful in differentiating the similar and divergent responses of the United States and the European states to a series of regional and functional issues and to assess from these varied reactions whether the Atlantic Alliance is apt and able to meet the common problems confronting the Western democracies in concert or, as Aldo Moro once suggested, through parallel convergencies of actions and policies. On some questions the European states can be expected to be partial to United States leadership and to subordinate their qualms and qualifications to American wishes. Though this is most commonly the case on questions of European defense and deterrence, even here great variations in interests, perspectives, and commitments are detectable. On other questions European and American actions will be different but will converge on impact as parts of a greater policy whole. The Berlin and German accords of the early 1970s illustrate this level of cooperation. On still other issues, usually those of lesser urgency, there will be little need for alignment. Burden sharing within the European Community budget comes within this rubric although at one time such a question would have risen to the level of Atlantic concern, just as the question of enlarging the Atlantic Alliance has today. On still other questions-and increasingly this appears to be the case-Europeans will be inclined to change partners, preferring third world states or even implicit alignment with the Soviet Union over the United States. Or, they will stand apart, either feigning to be impartial observers or unsolicitedly advancing themselves as inferlocufeurs valables where they may not be wanted, as in the