Europe’s “independence wars”: A constitutional perspective—A reply to Antoine Vauchez

Abstract

Abstract This reply to Antoine Vauchez deploys a constitutional perspective to analyze three critical moments identified by Vauchez in the institutional evolution of the European Union. It argues that a constitutional lens offers a more robust perspective for considering the key issues underlying each of the “critical junctures.” It enables a clearer identification of the costs to the EU of prioritizing functional objectives over democratization. It places debate about the independence of the European Central Bank within the broader context of how to situate expert bodies within governance structures. The debates around the judiciary in Hungary and Poland can be seen as part of the inevitable tension between viewing Europe’s construction as a work in progress towards “ever closer union” and the idea that the basic rules of democratic political association should be settled and stable. Far from being a benign “proxy” for Europe’s constitutional evolution, “independence” obscures the real issues and the costs of evasion.