EU treaty referendums and the European union1

Abstract

Until the accession referendums of 1994, EU referendums had largely been regarded as indistinguishable from one another. This article establishes a typology of EU referendums by highlighting the particular characteristics of these referendums and their differing relationships with the European Union. It then examines two categories in particular‐treaty and quasi‐treaty referendums‐noting their implications for referendum theory along with their impact on the European Union. Treaty referendums, of most importance to the European Union, are considered abnormal referendums in that they re‐affirm decisions reached in earlier referendums and, through the actions of other members, their inherent fairness is compromised. They become asymmetrical devices as the status quo position ‘moves’ because of the ratifying actions of other members. By contrast, EU quasi‐treaty referendums are normal referendums in a theoretical sense but reflect a change in the purpose of, and actors involved in, a referendum. Traditional conceptions regard referendums as either a constitutional necessity or as a means of resolving inter and intra‐party disputes. Quasi‐treaty referendums resolve dilemmas between incumbent governments and their people, on the one hand, and the obligations of membership of the European Union on the other. However their real impact on the European Union lies in their potential to shape the direction of integration by a negative result. Such a result could bind national governments to a form of integration not shared by their co‐members and thus, by default, bring about a Europe à la carte.