EU Special Representatives: An Intergovernmental Tool in the Post-Lisbon Foreign Policy System?

Abstract

Following the Lisbon Treaty, various departments of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat merged into what became the European External Action Service (EEAS). In contrast, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), that are appointed by the Foreign Affairs Council and engage in conflict resolution on behalf of the EU, have remained an 'intergovernmental' instrument. Although they act under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, they are not funded from the EEAS' budget and not part of the formal hierarchy of the new service. Catherine Ashton's proposal in 2010 to remove the EUSRs and to integrate their tasks into the EEAS' activities was opposed by the EU foreign ministers. The paper looks at the EUSRs' role in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system and their relations with the relevant EU institutions. It argues that the Member States have an interest in retaining the EUSRs in order to ensure intergovernmental control over parts of EU foreign policy vis-à-vis the EEAS, the European Parliament and the European Commission. However, this must not necessarily undermine the activities of the EEAS and ultimately the coherence of the EU's external relations.