Abstract

New modes of governance are proliferating at all levels, most prominently in the EU. One main characteristic of new governance is adjustability and revisability in the form of soft law. The non-binding nature of soft law is said to contribute to flexibility and diversity in Member States and to secure national autonomy. However, this article argues that while soft law may not be legally binding, it nevertheless has legal effects that throw flexibility and diversity of national action into doubt. Beginning by demonstrating that soft law may have discernible effects on practices in Member States, at the same time restricting Member State choices, the article goes on to develop a categorisation of those effects and to document them in detail. These are: judicial recognition by the European courts, explicit terms of soft law instruments, which demand special types of national implementing measures, the role played by non-state actors, and hybrid forms of regulatory instruments comprising soft and hard law provisions. The analysis shows a need to add variety to existing research on EU soft law, which has traditionally focused on the role of the judiciary in giving legal effects to soft law. Instead, we should be more attentive to the other three factors when discussing soft law. Besides the more holistic approach, research should also analyse soft law in a more case-specific manner in order to fully grasp the implications of choice of soft law in a domestic legal system.

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