EU Relations with Russia: Partnership or Asymmetric Interdependency?

Abstract

Policy convergence is often seen as an end in itself that is ubiquitously positive. The core theoretical assumption that underpins convergence is that the stronger the co-ordination of policy among co-operating states, the greater are the benefits and the more powerful will be the impact of the policy. Theory also suggests that optimum co-ordination requires a unitary actor. This norm is inherent in the deterministic logic of integration theory in regard to the erosion of national sovereignties and interests by multilateral convergence or congruence within the EU. To the normative and theoretical dimensions of integration we must add the role of contingency. Temporally contemporaneous and linked developments impelled the drive for greater integration in Europe: the collapse of communism, and the complex regime transitions and conflicts of the former communist states were accompanied by the acceleration of the EU’s transformation from an economic to a political union in the 1990s. The evolution of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is generally seen as one of the key institutional developments in the strengthening trend of convergence in response to changes in the regional and global order. But how much convergence has there been, and to what effect? The analysis of EU-Russia relations since the collapse of communism allows us to test the extent of foreign policy convergence by member states in a crucial external relationship. We begin by identifying the main contours of the issues that have shaped the EU’s policy on Russia, and then we evaluate the extent of policy convergence and the effectiveness of the institutional architecture that emerged in the EU to manage policy on Russia.