EU Fiscal Governance and the Effectiveness of its Reform

Abstract

This paper analyses the reforms of the fiscal governance in the Euroopean Union introduced after the euro crisis. The first section is descriptive and gives a brief overview of the new fiscal governance as modified by the six-pack, the TSCG and the two-pack. The second section is critical and analyses the weaknesses of the original fiscal governance and the effectiveness of the recent reforms. The third section briefly concludes. Originally in 1992, the EU fiscal governance was based on fiscal decentralisation constrained by rules (limits of 3% government deficit and 60% government debt) whose compliance was monitored annually and whose violation are sanctioned (the excessive deficit procedure). The financial solidarity was minimal. The Euro crisis and the high financial instability of some Member States have shown the severe flaws of such governance model: the fiscal rules were sometimes inappropriate and often poorly implemented. Inevitably then, the crisis led to more financial solidarity than expected. To remedy those flaws, the EU fiscal governance has been substantially reformed by the six-pack in 2011, the TSCG in 2012 and the two-pack in 2013. Such reforms, which were probably the only politically feasible, have improved the three components of the governance: on rules, they make the fiscal objectives and limits smarter; on institutions, they improve the quality of data and forecasts needed to apply properly the rules, and ensure a better national ownership; on enforcement, they improve the design and the decision-making process of the sanctions at the EU level and create an national correction mechanism. All of that could still be fine-tuned: the fiscal rules could better differentiate between productive and less productive public investment, a network of the Commission and the newly established national fiscal councils could be set up, and the decision-making process and the criteria used by the Commission in proposing the sanctions could be made more transparent. But more fundamental reforms are needed to ensure the sustainability of the EMU. The legitimacy of the new EU surveillance and sanctions tools should be improved in several ways: explaining better the rationale for the constitutionalization of the fiscal rules, enhancing dialogue between EU and national bodies (economic dialogue …) as well as among national institutions (parliament, IFCs ..), increasing the EU parliamentary oversight where the Commission power have been enhanced. Other models of governance may also be developed. The sticks of the fiscal governance (sanctions) should be complemented with carrots (financial incentives). More centralisation of fiscal policy could be ensured with the creation of a Eurozone budget to absorb asymmetric macro-economic shocks or the issuance of common Eurobonds. Those reforms may be difficult to agree today, but the risk is that the fatigue of the citizens towards the European Union, of which the economic governance is one of the most visible parts, and the rise of nationalism within the Member States will make any reform even more difficult tomorrow.