EU의 공동외교안보정책과 우크라이나 전쟁

Abstract

This paper seeks to anlayze whether the Capability-Expectations Gap (CEG) of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy has been narrowed after the War in Ukraine broke out on 24th February 2022. It compares in the components of the CEGs before and after the war. Christopher Hill defines the capability as being composed of the resources (economic and diplomatic), policy instruments and policy cohesiveness.
 Before the war, Brexit left the EU’s economic power dwindled by 2.17% point from 15.7% to 13.62% in world output. Policy instruments have seen some changes, as the EU could manage to give military as well as economic aid to Ukraine for the first time. Although the EU is not a military alliance, EU leaders could reach agreements on sending military equipments in the face of Russian aggression. Policy cohesiveness refers to the ability to reach agreements and implement such ones among differing national policy preferences. Hungary remained opposed to banning Russian oil and gas imports to the last moment, thus gaining exemption from the EU’s sanction until the end of 2023, at least a year later after such sanction entered into force.
 With regard to expectations from within and without of the EU, citizens in Europe have wanted the bloc to play a more active role in major international affairs such as in the Ukraine War. The EU also could follow through many sanctions in close consultation with the United States, which has led Western efforts in giving aid to Ukraine.
 EU’s international role is likely to grow in the process of mediating the war, as the war is probably to last another a year or two. It will also shoulder significant burden to help Ukraine reconstruct after the War.