Abstract

The paper discusses the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia through two ethical perspectives: deontological or the ethics of duty and consequentialist or the ethics of consequences. The hypothetical starting point is that, if the aggression is based on moral principles, then those principles should also characterize it, starting from intention, motive, goals, means to final result, and if this is not the case, the aggression cannot be justified from a moral point of view. The objective of the paper is to present the unsustainability, in an ethical and moral sense, of the "humanitarian" character of the intervention and reasons such as the prevention of humanitarian catastrophe and the protection of human rights. After the introductory part of the paper, the theoretical basis and analytical approach have been presented, in order to consider the moral sustainability of the reasons for the aggression and its moral character through a deontological and consequentialist ethical perspective. It has been concluded that the aggression does not fully meet the deontological and consequentialist criteria of moral rightness, that is, that interests are hidden behind moral reasons. Morality does not have a decisive role in international relations, but it is, along with international law, the only argument that small countries can invoke. The hypothetico-deductive, descriptive and analytical-synthetic methods have been used in the paper.

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