Ethnic Tensions between the Han and the Hui: The Neo-Sufi Jahriyya Movement of Ma Hua Long of the Late Qing Period (1862-1871)

Religions are playing an ever more prominent role in the public sphere in the world today, and it hardly seems productive to examine religion–state relations from the traditional liberal standpoint of idealising the state's non-intervention in religious matters. In this article we examine the relations between Islam and the state in Turkey, Russia/the Soviet Union and China, using the concept of the ‘confessional state’. A confessional state tries to use not only its dominant religion but also minority religions of all kinds to mobilise wider groups of the population. In confessional states the relations between the state and bodies of clergy are federative, not master-subordinate. The core of the Ottoman confessional state was the millet system, while the şeyhülislam managed the Muslim majority. The Russian Empire copied the şeyhülislam and created the Muftiate. Neither the Qing Empire nor the Republic of China built a nationwide system of Muslim administration, so the People's Republic of China architected it from scratch, on the basis of its own communist idea of the ‘united front’. These confessional states were seriously damaged by Atatürk's secularism in Turkey, communist atheism in the Soviet Union and the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China. Later, leaders of these countries realised that secularism and communism could not monopolise the spiritual market of faith, and desperately needed to mobilise the nation, even with the help of traditional religion. They did not try to reintroduce confessional states on the lines of those which had historically existed, but tried to use religious congregations to mobilise the wider strata of the population. In this attempt, the three countries faced different challenges: Turkey suffers from the confessional homogeneity of the state; postcommunist Russia lacks a nationwide Muslim administration; and in China the Muslims do not have an autonomous clerical hierarchy.

김정희가 살았던 19세기의 청나라는 고증학이 전성기에 처해 있던 시점이었다. 김정희는 청나라를 방문하고 당시 유명한 학자였던 옹방강(翁方綱), 완원(阮元)과 사승관계를 맺었고, 청대의 학술성과를 적극적으로 수용하였다. <실사구시설(實事求是說)>은 김정희의 학문적 경향을 보여주는 중요한 작품으로, 지금까지 많은 연구가 이루어졌으나 청대 학술과의 영향 관계가 제대로 구명되지 않았다는 아쉬움이 있다. 특히 김정희의 경학 연구를 직접적으로 지도한 옹방강이 청대 고증학에서 어느 정도 지점에 있었던 사람인지, 김정희의 학문이 당시의 조선 학문 및 청나라의 학문과 어떤 면에서 계승관계 혹은 영향관계에 놓여 있는지에 대해서는 선행연구에서 아직 깊이 있게 논의되지는 않은 것으로 생각된다. 본고에서는 이런 문제의식을 가지고 김정희의 고증학 경향을 보여주는 글로 평가되는 <실사구시설>을 중심으로 고증학에 대한 김정희의 관점을 옹방강과의 비교 및 청대 학술과의 관련성 속에서 살펴보았다. 옹방강은 청대 고증학이 전성기에 처한 시기에 생활하였던 사람으로, 고증학의 영향을 깊이 받기는 하였지만 청대 학술에서 그의 위치는 고증학 학자가 아니라 이학자이며, 고증학을 의리지학을 밝히기 위한 수단으로 보는 입장에서 고증학의 대표적인 학자들을 비판하고 배격하는 모습을 보였다. 김정희는 고증학의 연구 성과를 적극적으로 수용하려는 태도를 보였지만, 훈고와 의리에 대한 그의 태도는 기본적으로 옹방강과 다르지 않다. 그의 <실사구시설>은 훈고를 중시하되 그것은 의리를 밝히기 위한 방편에 불과하다는 입장을 드러낸 글이다. 또한 사승과 가학을 강조하면서 경전과 한대 학자인 정현(鄭玄)의 주석의 정통적 지위를 수호하려는 태도는 진정한 실사구시적 태도라고 보기 어려우며, 고증학보다는 성리학에 치우치는 경향을 보여준다.The Qing Dynasty of the 19th century, where Kim, Jeong-hee, lived, was at the height of textual criticism. Kim, Jeong-hee, visited the Qing Dynasty and established a private relationship with Weng, Fang-gang(翁方綱) and Ruan, Yuan(阮元), who were famous scholars at the time, and actively accepted the academic achievements of the Qing Dynasty. Silsagusisheol(實事求是說) is an important work that shows Kim, Jeong-hee’s academic tendency, and many studies have been conducted so far, but it is regrettable that the influence relationship with Qing Dynasty scholarship has not been properly investigated. In particular, it is thought that previous studies have not yet discussed in depth how Weng, fang-gang, who directly guided Kim Jeong-hee’s study, was a person in Qing Dynasty textual criticism, and in what ways Kim Jeong-hee’s studies lie in succession or influence with Joseon studies and Qing studies at the time. With this awareness of the problem, this paper examined Kim, Jeong-hee’s perspective on historical studies in comparison with Weng, Fang-gang and its relevance to Qingdai Studies, focusing on the Silsagusisheol, which is evaluated as an article that shows Kim, Jeong-hee’s tendency to historical studies. Weng, Fang-gang was a person who lived in the heyday of Qing Dynasty textual criticism, and although he was deeply influenced by it, his position in Qing Dynasty academia was not a historical scholar, but a Neo-Confucianism scholar, and he criticized and rejected representative scholars of textual criticism. Kim, Jeong-hee, showed an attitude to actively accept the research results of textual criticism, but his attitude toward explanations of words in ancient books and loyalty is basically no different from Weng, Fang-gang. His Silsagusisheol is an article that emphasizes explanations of words in ancient books, but reveals that it is only a way to express loyalty. In addition, it is difficult to say that the attitude of presiding over the orthodox status of Confucian classics and oriental scholar Zheng, Xuan(鄭玄) while emphasizing Neo-Confucianism is a true practical attitude, and it tends to be biased toward Neo-Confucianism rather than textual criticism.

Reviewed by: Opera, Society, and Politics in Modern China by Hsiaot'i Li Yizhou Huang OPERA, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN MODERN CHINA. By Hsiaot'i Li. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019. 376 pp. Cloth, $49.95. Although the model operas produced during China's Cultural Revolution stand out in theatre history for their ability to seamlessly blend traditional forms with contemporary concerns, a number of scholars writing in English have shed light on experiments that preceded these performances. Colin Mackerras, for instance, has pointed out that popular opera played a part in the collapse of the Qing Dynasty (Chinese Theatre: From Its Origins to the Present Day). Later, researchers have discussed politicized performances in the context of subsequent historical moments and specific geographical locations, including the Sino-Japanese War (Chang-tai Hung, War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937–1945), the Yan'an years of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (David Holm, Art and Ideology in Revolutionary China), and the CCP's rural revolution (Brian James DeMare, Mao's Cultural Army: Drama Troupes in China's Rural Revolution). Citing Chinese, English, and Japanese sources, Hsiao-t'i Li joins these scholars to think about reformed opera in Opera, Society, and Politics in Modern China, but his project is more ambitious in scope. With an emphasis on intellectual discourses, Li delineates and contextualizes the repurposing of popular opera to serve sociopolitical agendas from the 1900s to the 1940s. He argues that this continuous use of reformed opera for social criticism, enlightenment, and revolutionary propaganda was propelled by the timehonored tradition of jiaohua (moral transformation) in imperial China and its radicalized variations in the twentieth century (p. 1). In a way, this book is a continuation of Li's earlier project, Qingmo de xiaceng shehui qimeng yundong, 1901–1911 [End Page 277] (The Late Qing Popular Enlightenment Movement, 1901–1911) in which he examines the roles of popular forms, including vernacular Chinese newspaper, public speech, and opera, in educating the masses. Lying at the heart of Li's discussion are two in-depth case studies: the Xin Wutai (New Stage) of Shanghai and the Yisushe (the Shaanxi Society to Transform Customs) of Xi'an, Shaanxi Province. Founded, among others, by actors Xia Yueshan, Xia Yuerun, Pan Yueqiao, and merchants Li Pingshu and Shen Manyu, the New Stage (1908–1927) spearheaded experiments that came to be known as haipai jingju (Shanghai-style Beijing Opera). The Yisushe, by contrast, produced reformed qinqiang (the Qin tune opera), the regional form of Shaanxi Province in northwestern China. Established by gentry-literati Li Tongxuan, Sun Renyu, et al. in 1912, this theatre group is still in business today. The helmsmen of both the New Stage and the Yisushe had connections with Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenghui (the Revolutionary Alliance) and the Xinhai Revolution, which partly explained their shared interest in reformed opera. The critical juxtaposition of the two case studies leads to fruitful comparisons: a national opera versus a regional style, a semi-colonial treaty port versus an inland garrison city, and a market-driven company targeted at urban audiences versus a theatrical society with strong rural connections. Such comparisons highlight the importance of local contexts as well as the various factors at play between opera and society. This comparative framework also distinguishes Li's project from existing scholarship on China's theatre reform. The book consists of an overture, six chapters, and a finale. After laying out the structure, key concepts, and major themes in the overture, Li provides some background information on opera in late imperial China in chapter 1. He documents the rise of jingju over kunqu and huabu (flowery tunes) over yabu (elegant tunes) in the Qing Dynasty. Accounting for a wide array of audience groups of popular opera, including members of the court, the gentry-literati, merchants, and the masses (p. 19), Li specifies the circumstances under which different groups attended opera and the venues they frequented. Here, Li pays special attention to the urban and rural differences that existed in opera performances. Towards the end of the chapter, Li argues that historically religion and theatre were intertwined: not only did rituals and performances take place in proximity with...

Continuing the Reevaluation:Four Studies of the Cultural Revolution John A. Rapp (bio) Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals. Mao's Last Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. xiii, 693 pp. Hardcover $35.00, ISBN 978-0-674-02332-1. Paperback $20.95, ISBN 978-0-674-02748-0. Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun. The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007. xxi, 705 pp. Hardcover $109.95, ISBN 978-0-7656-1096-6. Paperback $49.95, ISBN 978-0-076561097-3. Mobo Gao . The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 2008. xi, 270 pp. Hardcover $90.00, ISBN 978-0-7453-2781-5. Paperback $27.95, ISBN 978-0-7453-2780-8. Paul Clark . The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xii, 352 pp. Hardcover $80.00, ISBN 978-0-521-87515-8. Paperback $22.99, ISBN 978-0-521-69786-6. Over forty years after the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China and over thirty years after its official end, Chinese and Western scholars are still arguing, not over the import of the movement—about which nearly everyone agrees is very great—but about its true nature and meaning. Was this cataclysmic event really a true revolution in Chinese culture and an attempt to preserve the socialist gains of the 1949 revolution against revisionists who would lead China back down the road toward capitalist inequality, as Maoists and their defenders in the West argue to varying degrees? Or, instead, was it really about a simple power struggle between Mao and his followers, on the one hand, and other ruling elites in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on the other hand? Although of course there are many other possible views in between these two poles, at least three of the books under review come down clearly on one side or the other. MacFarquhar (a professor of history and government at Harvard) and Schoenhals (a professor of modern Chinese society at Lund University in Sweden) attempt, by far, the most comprehensive history of the period, based on their own previous extensive scholarship as well as on new Chinese-language materials made available during the 1980s and 1990s. Their book could well serve as a basic text in courses on the Cultural Revolution, with a caveat about their narrow, if justified, focus on elite politics. Their basic conclusion is that "the Cultural Revolution [End Page 160] was so great a disaster that it provoked an even more profound cultural revolution, precisely the one that Mao intended to forestall" (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 3) and that it was Mao Zedong himself who was primarily responsible for the Cultural Revolution. Using mostly an analysis of factional politics at the top of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP), the authors wholeheartedly accept what they recognize as the "common verdict" that without the Cultural Revolution there would have been no economic reform era. What they demonstrate quite persuasively more directly is that without Mao, there would have been no Cultural Revolution. Teiwes (an emeritus professor of Chinese politics, University of Sydney) and Sun (a senior lecturer in Chinese studies, Monash University) come to a very similar conclusion in their study of elite politics during the last half of the Cultural Revolution (the first installment of a projected three-volume work on the transition from "revolution through restoration toward reform" [Teiwes and Sun, p. xiv] that will cover the years from 1972-1982). Based on a review of many of the same sources of official and unofficial biographies and memoirs covered by MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, as well as on their own extensive personal interviews with Party historians and political figures involved in elite politics of the period, the authors conclude that even in the later years of the Cultural Revolution, from the fall of Defense Minister Lin Biao in 1971 to Mao's death in 1976 (when Mao was supposedly being challenged from other leaders and his health began to decline), in fact, Mao completely dominated elite politics almost to the very end of...

The Cultural Revolution was an emotionally charged political awakening for the educated youth of China. Called upon by aging revolutionary Mao Tse-tung to assume a “vanguard” role in his new revolution to eliminate bourgeois revisionist influence in education, politics, and the arts, and to help to establish proletarian culture, habits, and customs, in a new Chinese society, educated young Chinese generally accepted this opportunity for meaningful and dramatic involvement in Chinese affairs. It also gave them the opportunity to gain recognition as a viable and responsible part of the Chinese polity. In the end, these revolutionary youths were not successful in proving their reliability. Too “idealistic” to compromise with the bourgeois way, their sense of moral rectitude also made it impossible for them to submerge their factional differences with other revolutionary mass organizations to achieve unity and consolidate proletarian victories. Many young revolutionaries were bitterly disillusioned by their own failures and those of other segments of the Chinese population and by the assignment of recent graduates to labor in rural communes. Educated Youth and the Cultural Revolution in China reconstructs the events of the Cultural Revolution as they affected young people. Martin Singer integrates material from a range of factors and effects, including the characteristics of this generation of youths, the roles Mao called them to play, their resentment against the older generation, their membership in mass organizations, the educational system in which they were placed, and their perception that their skills were underutilized. To most educated young people in China, Singer concludes, the Cultural Revolution represented a traumatic and irreversible loss of political innocence, made yet more tragic by its allegiance to the unsuccessful campaign of an old revolutionary to preserve his legacy from the inevitable storms of history.

Based on the theoretical model of pedagogic discourse proposed by Basil Bernstein, this paper proposes two notions, elaborated ideological orientation and restrictive ideological orientation, to understand the new relationship between the State and intellectuals in China, which is crucial to understanding intellectual practices after the Cultural Revolution in China. The reform has made it possible for the production of discourse in education which is not directly derived from Marxism and Maoism. Such diversification of legitimate positions does not amount to an autonomous discourse in education. This paper chooses the case of an influential journal, Jiaoyu Yanjiu (Educational Research) to illustrate the ways in which the editors of the journal have taken up the role of mediator between the State and authors.

Classical Confucianism stresses the priority of filial piety and family relationships over justice. In particular, Confucius’ emphasis on the importance of mutual concealment of wrongdoings among family members was generally criticized as corruption, violating the idea of universal justice and leading to a paradoxical conclusion. However, for Confucianism, the family is of paramount importance not only to one's self-cultivation but also to the establishment of social order. The reflection on the impact of the Cultural Revolution in China also brings us insights into the Confucian emphasis on the importance of family relationships. I argue that the destruction caused by the Cultural Revolution was partly due to a weakening sense of Confucian familism. A strong sense of Confucian familism can ensure social stability and prevent social turmoil in radical political situations. This chapter will also explore the boundaries regarding the priority of family relationships over justice.

Revolution is an event that had taken place in many countries in the 20th century. Revolution was not only imagined in Western historical writing as a radical change of social life, but also perceived as representing a return to the old form of social rule in the end. The Chinese ideas of revolution in the 20th century evolved from the traditional idea that the change of dynasties was due to the change of mandate. The modern Chinese idea of revolution also incorporated the European idea that revolution would lead to a higher form of social development. The interpretation of the aim of Chinese revolution in the 20th century China shows that Chinese theorists had a misunderstanding for a long time regarding revolution as representing an ultimate social state and not as a means to achieve political modernization. A theoretical rethinking of the concept after the Cultural Revolution has resulted in an advance in China’s social evolution.

In 1950, Cominform (the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties) criticised the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) for promoting ‘peaceful revolution’ under the Allied Occupation. The critique led to the so-called ‘1950 issue’, a period beset by ideological divisions, in which the JCP split, with one faction continuing to support ‘peaceful revolution’ and the other siding with Cominform’s views. Nuyama Hiroshi founded the magazine Gurafu wakamono (Graph Youth) in 1958 after a temporary respite to the 1950 issue. The magazine was aimed at the young people of Japan, and ran until 1971. Nuyama was regarded as an authority on cultural issues within the JCP and, in addition to being the first editor-in-chief of Gurafu wakamono, he led the ‘Dance for Dance’s Sake’ movement, sometimes referred to as the ‘Singing and Dancing Communist Party’. In 1966, during the lifetime of the magazine, Nuyama’s ideological differences regarding the Cultural Revolution in China led to his excommunication from the Communist Party. Drawing on material from the magazine itself, this article examines the democratic ideology promulgated by Gurafu wakamono and its successor magazine, also edited by Nuyama, with particular emphasis on editions published in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Based mainly on Albanian primary sources, this article is a comparative analysis of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution in communist Albania in the mid 1960s. The article emphasizes the importance that the regime placed on the historical tradition of mass mobilizations accumulated in other communist countries before, primarily Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China in the mid 1960s, and the Cultural Revolution in the Soviet Union during the 1930s. The article argues that the Cultural Revolution in communist Albania created new forms of legitimacy and strengthened the continuation of the policies that the communists had implemented since their coming to power. This differed from similar movements in the Soviet Union where the Cultural Revolution had a foundational aim, and also from the Chinese Cultural Revolution which resulted in a chaotic and disruptive movement. The article also argues that the regime had to resort to the revival of local traditions – carefully selected – and the people’s cultural production to forge forms of legitimacy that would allow the regime to mobilize a large part of the population around the Party’s political line. The carefully controlled mass movement targeted the country’s religions, transforming Albanian into the first official atheist state in Europe, the emancipation of women, and the increase of economic outputs through mass actions of volunteering work in specific economic projects. The movement nonetheless created spaces for personal affirmation, new cultural expressions, and often agency for the people involved. Finally, the article argues that the Cultural Revolution in Albania rather than emulating the Chinese and the Soviet experiences, responded to the ruling party’s necessity to further its political and economic aims, while also strengthening and deepening the control of the party over the society.

Reviews 197© 1999 by University ofHawai'i Press Although Liu and Ma emphasize the role ofthe national college entrance exam in setting and maintaining high curriculum standards and student achievement, they keep coming back to the overriding effect ofchanges in social and political values in China. For centuries the entire Chinese governmental mechanism has been highly centralized, and this has been reflected in Chinese cultural attitudes concerning governance. There are no similar structural and cultural parallels in the North American context. But in the end, they argue that the vast socioeconomic and political inequality in China—affecting teachers and students, the quality ofschools, and the labor market—overwhelms the centralized nature of curriculum planning and standards: "Teaching facilities at the key-note schools at the national and provincial levels are likely first class and far above the requirement of the unified curriculum, comparable to international standards. While ordinary schools are far beyond die reach ofthe requirement ofthe national curriculum " (sic) (p. 169). And, "Therefore, the prioritization ofeducational resources created by the national curriculum in fact generates the prioritization of social interest" (p. 170). Therein lies the lesson of a centralized, unified national curriculum. In sum, this book delivers on its promise, although it would have benefited from a strong editorial hand. Vilma Seeberg Vilma Seeberg is an assistantprofessor ofinternational-intercultural education at Kent State University. Roderick MacFarquhar. The Origins ofthe Cultural Revolution. Volume 3, The Coming ofthe Cataclysm, 1961-1966. Oxford: Oxford University Press; New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 733 pp. Hardcover $47.50, isbn 0-231-11082-0. Twenty-three years after the publication ofthe first volume ofthis trilogy on the origins ofthe Cultural Revolution, we now have the much-awaited final volume. Like the first two, this final installment is also meticulously researched and attractively produced. Indeed, the intervening years since the publication ofvolume 1 in 1974 have seen the release ofa torrent ofnew documents and publications in China, and MacFarquhar has taken full advantage ofthe newly available materials. Volume 3 has a total ofmore than 2,400 notes, compared with just un- 198 China Review International: Vol. 6, No. ?, Spring 1999 der 1,500 in volume 1 and more than 1,900 in volume 2. Each note in volume 3 also appears to be longer than the average note in the earlier volumes; many are, in fact, brief essays. In spite ofthe great length ofthis volume and of the trilogy as a whole, the central thesis ofvolume 3 is quite straightforward. MacFarquhar argues that two related developments, the failure ofthe Great Leap Forward and the vicissitudes in Sino-Soviet relations, can largely (though not fully) explain why Mao chose to turn on his heir apparent, state president Liu Shaoqi, and launch the Cultural Revolution. The colossal failure of the GLF plunged China into the worst famine in human history, pitted society against the state, fundamentally altered the attitudes ofChina's top leaders toward rural organizations, and sowed the seeds of suspicion in Mao toward his colleagues. Meanwhile, the retreat from Stalinism in the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet dispute caused Mao to worry about "a similar betrayal of the revolution in China" (p. 6). These concerns plus genuine political differences between Mao and Liu sealed Liu's fate. Mao's attack against Liu thus had both domestic and international dimensions. Indeed, when this volume, like the first two, is translated into Chinese, Chinese readers will find an image ofLiu Shaoqi that is considerably at variance with conventional wisdom in China. Radier than the number one capitalist roader that he was accused of being during the Cultural Revolution, Liu comes through these pages as Mao's lieutenant but especially a Party man who oversaw the Party machine and was bent on maintaining control. During the Socialist Education Movement that followed the Great Leap debacle, for example, Liu veered toward the extreme left and spearheaded a purge of rural Party members and cadres with ruthless thoroughness. In contrast, Mao was more tolerant ofgrassroots cadres and saw problems higher up. Seen in today's perspective, readers will likely have some sympathy for Mao's removal ofLiu, ifnot for the profound humiliation Liu was made to endure. The portrait...

In China 1935 was known as 'the year of Nora' with Ibsen's A Doll House (often re-titled as Nora) being produced in major cities throughout the country. An unknown actress, Li Yunhe, who had come to Shanghai and changed her name to Lan Ping, played the title character, Nora, at the invitation of a left-wing theatre company. The success of Nora not only launched Lan Ping from obscurity to fame overnight, but enabled her to explore the new territory of the film industry. Several years later, she changed her name again, this time to Jiang Qing and shortly became Madam Mao, a role that most people remember her. From 1935 to 1937 , reports about Lan Ping, often accompanied by photographs, frequently appeared in the theatre sections of newspapers and film magazines. The photographs of Lan Ping as herself invariably present a modern woman, confident and yet attractive, a symbolic Chinese Nora. This image of Jiang may surprise those who know her only as Madam Mao through the photos taken of her in the Yan'an period (1937-1947 ), in the 1950s, and during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). By tracing Lan Ping/Jiang Qing's photographic metamorphosis, this article examines different discourses of ideal womanhood as conveyed by presentations of the female body in the pre-Mao period and in Mao's China. Be they the May-Fourth intellectuals, Left-wing intellectuals, or leaders in the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese thinkers of all stripes imagined modernity and their new nation through the female body, and thus set out to become arbiters of women's public style, in such matters as hairstyle and clothes. What to wear and how to wear could demonstrate whether a woman was advanced in thinking and embodied a proper attitude towards new gender role. In addition to examining the gender performance of Lan Ping/Jiang Qing in three important periods, this article exposes the paradox of the male-constructed gender discourses by exploring how the criticism she met with is deeply rooted in patriarchal conceptions of gender. Finally, this article looks at how Lan Ping/Jiang Qing, rather than being a passive object of gender discourses, to varying degrees participated in and manipulated the construction of contemporary gender discourses.

In the Wake of the Cultural Revolution:Chinese Translations of Hard Times (1978) and Great Expectations (1979) Minghui Li (bio) The Cultural Revolution in China (1966–1976) represented a major and defining era in the nation’s history: the political, economic and social impact on the population was huge. In the immediate aftermath of this painful period, a search for new ideas and points of orientation began, an impetus that called on the nation to look back before looking forward. In the three decades following the Cultural Revolution, the novels of Charles Dickens enjoyed a remarkable reaffirmation of the place they had formerly held in the country’s cultural life since the early twentieth century. It is of particular significance that the first two translations of his works to be published after “the storm” were Hard Times and Great Expectations.1 The titles themselves appeared to speak to the wounded Chinese soul, although nothing was said directly on this subject in the individual forewards that accompanied the publication of each novel at the time. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the attitude to Dickens had been one of enthusiasm, a predictable response given the author’s critical portrayal of capitalist society. Equally unsurprising, the artistic value of his fiction had received less scrutiny. After 1976, however, Dickens’s work was seen to present broader opportunities for the publishing houses. As the Chinese authorities tried to distance themselves from the Cultural Revolution, the novels of the English author offered the chance to consider humanism as opposed to realism, individualism as opposed to collectivism; at the same time, the translation and publication of several of his works was considered [End Page 300] to be an important task for publishers. Evidence of this is that the following were published by Shanghai Translation Publishing House: Hard Times (1978), translated by Quan Zenggu (全增嘏) and Hu Wenshu (胡文淑); Great Expectations (1979), translated by Wang Keyi (王科一); Bleak House (1979), translated by Huang Bangjie (黄邦杰), Chen Shaoheng (陈少衡) and Zhang Zimo (张自谋); The Pickwick Papers (1979) translated by Jiang Tianzuo (蒋天佐), although Pickwick had been first published in 1947; David Copperfield (1980) translated by Zhang Guruo (张谷若); and A Tale of Two Cities (1989), translated by Zhang Liang (张玲) and Zhang Yang (张扬). But the two most important novels were, without doubt, Hard Times and Great Expectations. For such politically charged but also versatile works, the challenge for any translator was going to be great. While Hard Times had already been translated during the 1920s, the publication of Great Expectations in 1979 was an important literary event marking the first Chinese translation of the novel. The linguistic challenges of the two novels, as well as their critical treatment of capitalist values, suggest that these two works held particular significance for Chinese literary and translation history. The timing of the publication in 1978 and 1979 during a period of drastic social, political and cultural upheaval lent even more impact to their reception in China. For these reasons, any study of the global significance of Hard Times and Great Expectations must take into account their literary, political and socio-cultural contribution to intellectual life in China. Before considering the specific translations, let me comment briefly on the previous history of Chinese translations of Dickens, not least since he was one of the earliest European-American writers introduced into China. Dickens was also one of the most translated foreign writers in Chinese translation history. Following the first group of translations – Nicholas Nickleby, The Old Curiosity Shop, David Copperfield, Oliver Twist and Dombey and Son, introduced by Lin Shu to China between 1907 and 1909, interest in his works increased. The only real interruption occurred between 1966 and 1976. Both before and after the Cultural Revolution, Dickens was highly regarded as an outstanding critical realist in China, whose novels, literary critics agreed, illuminated various aspects of humanistic thought. To coincide with the 125th anniversary of his birth, a Chinese journal titled Translation devoted a special issue to Dickens in 1937, presenting three articles about his work to Chinese readers. Written by a Soviet critic, the first was entitled “迭更斯论—为人道而战的现实主义大师” (“The Realist Master of Humanism”).2 The author’s objective was to present [End Page 301] Dickens to Chinese readers as an...

중국 애니메이션과 모범극의 상관관계 연구 - 문화대혁명 시기의 미학 원칙을 중심으로

My article is divided into four parts. In the first part I lay out briefly the historical context of the Cultural Revolution. In the second part, I examine the concept of “cultural revolution” as it appears in classical Marxism and as understood by Mao Zedong. In part three, through digging out some positive values present in the Cultural Revolution, I attempt to show that the 1960s was not merely negation. And in part four I consider some of the effects of the Cultural Revolution, which may be relevant today, not only for China but for our “depoliticized,” ecologically-threatened world.