Abstract

Do local systems of patronage in Indonesia cause or prevent intercommunal violence? In analysing the September 2010 ethnic riots in Tarakan, East Kalimantan, this article illustrates one mechanism by which clientelism can lead to violent communal conflict. Ethnic organizations claiming to represent the marginalized indigenous community engaged in a form of ‘ethnic outbidding’ in order to intimidate their way into local patronage networks. Apparent leadership of an aggrieved indigenous community gave organizations access to state resources that they would not otherwise have had. In order to sustain this status, however, these organizations were obliged to respond vigorously to any apparent insults to the community, thereby increasing the risks of intercommunal conflict.

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