Abstract

An immense role in the collapse of the USSR was played by a whole array of factors: the public being tired of the Communist project; the massive shortages of consumer goods, which made people hate the government; the growing opposition within the Communist party to Gorbachev’s reforms; the hesitation of the General Secretary who tried to rely in turn either on the right or on the left wing; the drastic fall in the living standards. The crucial role, however, was played by “the parade of sovereignties” and the Centre being too late in its attempts to address the national question. By the autumn of 1990, the President’s close associates started to sense that power was slipping from Gorbachev’s hands; with the fellow countrymen staying remarkably indifferent, the Soviet Union was heading towards dissolution as the ambitions of local party leaders in the constituent republics generated and cannily magnified nationalist and separatist trends. Gorbachev kept up his maneuver strategy, which put him on the verge of resignation in the spring of 1991 when his support was minimal. He seemed, though, to have managed to pull out of this dive thanks to the Soviet Union referendum held on March 17, in which the voters were asked if they considered the preservation of the USSR necessary. Eventually, however, the issue of preserving or not preserving a unified state depended directly on the position of Russia as the backbone of the Soviet Union. The study draws on the author’s personal archive of original testimonies and interviews of the political figures directly involved in the events in question.

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