Ethnic Conflict, Representation and the State in Belgium

Abstract

Covell's chapter discusses the relationship between systems of representation and political conflict in Belgium, contrasting the liberal with the consociational principles of representation. She notes that the two systems of representation are based on different assumptions. The liberal principle is based on the idea that interest is the main motive for political behavior and that open competition of interests is the best method of resolving conflicts. The consociational principle is based on the idea that identity is the mainspring of political behavior, that conflict of identities is dangerous, and that, therefore, it is better to freeze and accommodate differences between groups than to permit their resolution through competition. She notes that there has been an evolution from individualist to "group-based forms of representation" in Belgium since 1830. The original conflicts that led to the adoption of group representation were religious and centered on the school system. The second great issue focused on class conflicts. During both struggles, the state was not seen as a neutral arena for the resolution of conflicts of interest through open competition but as the "source of the resources necessary for building up, perpetuating, and defending the position of each group." The result of the method of resolution of these early conflicts in Belgium was the establishment of a "bureaucratic-patronage" system in which "the resources of the state are used to maintain the elites that head [the] bureaucracies and to consolidate their control over their followings." The Belgian populations are clients of this system, tied to it by patronage rather than by intense feelings of emotional identification. In fact, the Belgian population is, politically, "extremely passive." The state is not an autonomous force in Belgium, regulating the relations between groups, but is a creature of the bureaucracies. Contemporary ethnic conflicts in Belgium, like the previous conflicts, have been primarily about access to resources for groups. Like previous conflicts, they have been settled through devices of group representation. These consociational devices 229are not, however, mechanisms developed to resolve "violent societal conflicts," but are mechanisms by which elites "defend their own position and that of their following." In fact, the elites may use and have used these mechanisms for conflict purposes, when necessary, to pursue their interests, with the result that conflict has increased rather than declined as a consequence of their adoption. Covell notes, finally, contra Barry, that there are no major differences between ethnic and other types of conflict in Belgium in form, substance, or consequences. If anything, religious and class divisions in Belgium have had the greater conflict potential. Ethnicity is no more real, "given," or solidary an identity than other types and ethnic conflict no less amenable to resolution than religious or class conflict. Covell's main point, however, is that the group representation and consociational devices adopted in Belgium were not designed, in any case, to resolve conflict but to pursue interests and gain control over resources. In this respect, she has removed one of the mystifying veils that cloak the consociational "solution" to conflict-ridden societies and that has led its promoters to accept at face value the justifications used for its adoption by those who stand to benefit from it.