Ethical expertise and Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs)

Abstract

In setting national standards for the ethical review of human research in Australia, the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research(NS) (2007) does not aim to be exhaustively prescriptive, and so requires a degree of ethical reflection when applying the principles of research merit and integrity, justice, beneficence and respect. There are two broad ways in which this need for ethical reflection can be understood. On an objectivist interpretation, an adequate levelof ethical expertise is required to ensure the informed application and implementation of these principles. From a subjectivist perspective, recourse to the 'community view' or common-sense morality provides an adequate basis for ethical reflection. The primary purpose of this article is to argue that the NSis itself an exercise in objectivist research ethics, but that what weknow of the current practices ofHRECs is more consistent with a subjectivist approach to ethical reflection, and that this mismatch is best addressed by improving the level of ethical expertise brought to bear in the ethical review of human research. The secondary purpose of this article is to briefly suggest ways of achieving this improvement within the parameters of a de-centralised system of review such as we have in Australia, yet also to hopefully stimulate debate as to whether this need to improve the level of expertise, ethical and otherwise, might best be served by moving towards a more centralised and professionalised system of ethical review.