Abstract

Standard earnings management detection is performed using two routes: real earnings management (connected with inventory and expenses manipulations) and accrual earnings management (connected with revenue and accounts receivables manipulations). Neither of the two detection algorithms attempts to quantify earnings management and connect it with the infractions committed by the companies, charged by the regulator (in this case U.S. SEC). In many known cases of revenue manipulation, it is not possible to say whether real or accrual based earnings management was used. In this research, we look at the cases of financial statement fraud, namely one of the most common variations - revenue manipulation, from the perspective of the practitioner and propose the way of detection and quantification of such manipulations. In order to distinguish the cases of earnings management, we use the components of DuPont formula. In addition, we also look at the accounting variables used in the calculation of the detection criterion and determine which ones of them play main role in the case of revenue manipulations.

Highlights

  • The phenomenon of earnings management is treated differently in various parts of the world and by professionals of various occupations

  • We show that the examination of liquidity-based financial variables and the indicators, used in the DuPont Formula, we can get a reasonably good indication whether the financial statements of a company include the results of earnings management, either Accruals Based Earnings Management (ABEM), or Real Earnings Management (REM), or both

  • We examine which accounting variables play the most important role in the increase of the absolute value of indicator of earnings management formulated in the methodology section

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Summary

Introduction

The phenomenon of earnings management is treated differently in various parts of the world and by professionals of various occupations. We view earnings management as a process of altering financial bottom line via artificially changing revenues and expenses figures (Bruns & Merchant, 1990). Accounting profession does not view earnings management as a punishable offence. Various accounting and financial scandals, happening at the turn of the 21st century (Urri, 2002) have prompted several prominent accounting organizations in the North America, such as AICPA2 and CICA3, change their view on earnings management. According to Dechow and Skinner (2000) U.S regulators changed their views on earnings management, which was followed by similar changes of position of German BAFIN4 (Achleitner, Günther, Kaserer, & Siciliano, 2014) and several other European organizations (Lang, Smith Raedy, & Wilson, 2006)

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