Abstract

When we appraise others as talented or virtuous, we esteem them: we register admiration of their traits and virtues. It is generally believed that, unless they involve a violation of respect, distributions of esteem are not a concern from the point of view of justice. In this paper, I want to dispute this commonly-held view. I will argue that attributions of esteem can become problematic when a particular trait becomes such a uniquely relevant source of social esteem in a community that its absence becomes a reason to regard others as less than full members of the community. For instance, in contemporary capitalist societies those perceived as lacking certain socially valued traits and unable or unwilling to make certain kinds of contribution to the community, such as those who are unemployed or have committed criminal offences, are widely disesteemed and also regarded as inferior qua members of the community by others. From the fact that they fail to possess particular qualities a broader negative judgment of their ability to contribute to the community is inferred. Moreover, their failure to gain esteem in these pervasive domains eclipses their possession of other esteem-worthy traits as well as other positive contributions they might have made to society. This perception of inferiority renders it impossible for them to live on equal terms with other citizens. I argue that as egalitarians we should oppose these distributions of esteem.

Highlights

  • While there is a substantial agreement that inequalities of respect are objectionable because respect should be conferred to all many believe that the distribution of esteem is not a concern from the point of view of justice

  • My objective in this paper is to identify ways in which esteem operates which are incompatible with the egalitarian ideal but distinct from violations of respect, namely cases in which esteem undermines equal status

  • Like Scanlon, Fourie and Jütten, I have rejected the view that inequalities of esteem should be considered objectionable only when they involve violations of respect but, unlike them, I have denied that this is only because of the feelings of inferiority such inequalities generate

Read more

Summary

Introduction

4, I reply to a possible objection by arguing that we attribute social esteem to other members of the community according to the standards of contribution, i.e. a limited set of traits which refers to one’s ability to contribute to socially shared goals. I move to analyse the relationship between esteem and respect, in order to show that while the fact that inequalities of esteem can involve violations of respect is one reason to regard them as objectionable, there is a separate reason to object to them, which has to do with their impact on the status of some citizens. I discuss and reply to a possible objection centred on the idea that what is objectionable about these distributions of esteem is not their impact on status, but the fact that they are incorrect judgments of esteem

The Concepts of Respect and Esteem
Objectionable Inequalities of Esteem
Pervasive Domains of Esteem and The Standards of Contribution
Objections to The Standards of Contribution
Two Types of Wrongs
A Final Objection
Conclusions
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call