Abstract

AbstractThe origins of the constitutional practice of European law clearly lie in the two famous rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa v. E.N.E.L (1964). Despite this, very little is known for sure about the genesis of the ECJ's interpretation or the dynamics within the Court at the time. Most accounts focus on the role of the ECJ in revolutionising European law. Using recently disclosed archival material, this article traces the role of the Legal Service of the European executive in the development of the constitutional practice. It demonstrates that the Legal Service played a crucial role both in terms of devising the legal philosophy behind the two rulings and in the establishing of a professional and academic field of European law, which would underpin the constitutional practice. At the same time it shows that the ECJ – although it adopted the legal philosophy recommended by the Legal Service – did this in a cautious and restricted manner to minimise national resistance.

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