Abstract
Abstract Essentialism is the philosophical position that concepts are underpinned by fixed, identity‐determining essences. It is often contrasted with nominalism, the view that concepts are mental constructions that reflect social and linguistic conventions. This contrast is fundamental to several debates in clinical psychology, notably whether the concept of “mental disorder” should be understood in an essentialist way, whether particular disorders represent essence‐based “natural kinds,” and whether essentialist thinking about mental disorders among laypeople is linked to mental illness stigma. The implications of the essentialism versus nominalism distinction within these three domains are reviewed.
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