Essence of Conflict: Cognitive Illusions, War Guilt, and the Origins of Appeasement

Abstract

Experimental studies consistently indicate that human information processing and decision making violate basic precepts of rationality. Yet rational choice theory is increasingly used to model organizations, politics, and international relations. Experimental evidence of cognitive bias is often discounted as methodological artifact because analysis, organization, specialization, and presence of strong incentives are presumed to eliminate bias outside laboratory. A controversy in historiography of Paris Peace Conference of 1919 provides an opportunity to address that assumption. Did the vindictiveness of British and French peace terms; exclusion of Germany and Russia from peace conferences . . . foolish attempts to draw blood of reparations and war debts . . . usher in second vast military conflagration (Kennan, 1996)? Or, was peace treaty a flexible instrument crafted by relatively well intentioned and rational leaders (Ikenberry, 2000)? The extensive record of primary and secondary sources was used to reconstruct beliefs, strategies, and actions of decision makers over an extended time frame. That pattern was tested against three conceptions of rationality: The pure form of noncooperative game theory, semi-strong form of Williamson's contractual man, and strongly bounded form of behavioral theory. Hypotheses regarding structure and implementation of Treaty derived from these three paradigms were tested. Both semistrong and strongly bounded conceptions of rationality accounted for structure of Treaty. Only behavioral conception of rationality could account for systematic failure in treaty implementation and evolution of Allied policy of appeasement. This strategy permitted Hitler regime to repeatedly and unilaterally deviate from provisions of Treaty to improve its political, economic, territorial, and military position at direct expense of Allies. The tragic course of war that followed is directly attributable to policy errors of 1930's which derived from earlier errors in initial construction of Treaty.