Erôs and Intelligible Desire in Plotinus’ Enneads

Abstract

In Ennead III.5 On Love, Plotinus' discussion of erôs is underlined by Plato’s discourse on love in the Symposium and the Phaedrus.[1] Plotinus conceives erôs as a purified power, which directs the soul to the intelligible realm of beauty and the world of the Forms.[2] Modern scholarship considers the Plotinian erôs as an ascending power that is always directed to the higher realm of the Forms and never to the lower perceptible realm. Throughout the Enneads, the soul is described as purely and originally an intelligible entity in all its manifestations and expressions (ex. Ennead IV.8).[3] Plotinus particularly supports a dual aspect theory of the soul, in which the homogenous psychē consists of two interrelated aspects - a higher intelligible part related to Intellect, and a lower perceptible part related to the sensible bodies (Caluori, 2015; Remes, 2007; Stamatellos, 2013; Stern-Gillet, 2009). However, limited attention has been paid to the intelligible aspects of the soul's desire in Plotinus' conception of erôs. In this context, this paper aims to revisit the view that Plotinus completely refuted the desire of the physical bodies, and consequently refuted erôs as a power directed to the lower perceptible realm (Ferwerda, 1965; Friedländer, 1964; Hadot, 1963; Wallis, 1995). It is argued that in light of the soul's intelligibility, desire also has an intelligible aspect when it is directed, along with the power of love, to the earthly realm and thus the true intelligible beauty of the perceptible bodies is recognized.
 
 [1] Hereafter, all quotations from Plotinus’ Enneads will solely refer to Armstrong’s (1966-1988) translations.
 [2] See Bertozzi (2012, 2021); Tatarkiewicz (1980); Wallis (1995); Wiitala (2013), Vasilakis (2021).
 [3] For Plotinus’ theory of the soul, see his treatises in Ennead IV. Also see Blumenthal (1971) and Caluori (2015).