Erratum: A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System

Abstract

in Political scientists have long been interested in conditions under which politicians delegate policy decisions to bureaucratic agencies (Wilson 1887; Landis 1938; Freedman 1981; Ara son, Gellhorn, and Robinson 1982; Fiorina 1982, 1986; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989). With a recent focus on divided and unified government, scholars have claimed that bu? reaucratic discretion will be greater when the legislative and executive branches are closely aligned (Epstein and O'Halloran 1994,1996,1999). In these models, given uncertainty over policy and executive over the agency, the legislature is only willing to delegate decisions to the agency when the executive's preferences are similar to those of the legislature, as under unified government.1 While these results seem intuitive, recent empirical analyses of delegation decisions paint a more complex picture. Epstein and O'Halloran, who initially formalized these results, examine the level of discretion in congres? sional legislation in the postwar years. They do, indeed, find support for greater discretion to executive-controlled agencies under unified govern? ment. However, they also find greater discretion to independent agencies under divided government. The first two categories, [Executive Office of the President] and cabinet departments, are used relatively more often un? der unified government, while independent agencies and commissions are used more often under divided control (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, 154-155). This result is not predicted by present models of delegation, which do not differentiate among agency types. Current empirical work has also focused on the state level to assess whether there is a link between discretion and unified government. For ex? ample, Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler (2001) explore whether state governments restricted Medicaid bureaucrats more substantially under divided