Erie and Problems of Constitutional Structure

Abstract

Copyright ? 2008 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications. Except for a few clarifying footnotes, the special agreements and procedures governing this piece precluded any expansive response to Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 699 (2008). t Associate Professor of Law, Temple University; J.D., Yale Law School. Many thanks to Jane Baron, Rick Greenstein, David Hoffman, Duncan Hollis, Laura Little, Andrea Monroe, and Louis Pollak for comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Kate Glaser, Natalie Hrubos, and Paul LaPlante for their extraordinary research assistance. 1. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459 (1997) [hereinafter Clark, Ascertaining the Laws]', Bradford R. Clark, The Constitutional Structure and the Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, Al St. Louis U. L.J. 753 (2003); Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the Eighth Amendment, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1149 (2006) [hereinafter Clark, Structure, Discretion, and the Eighth Amendment] (arguing that judicial discretion to displace state laws regarding punishments is not authorized by the Eighth Amendment and contradicts the Supremacy Clause); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1573 (2007) [hereinafter Clark, Domesticating] (arguing that the Supremacy Clause does not authorize sole executive agreements to override preexisting laws); Bradford R. Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1289 (2007) [hereinafter Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source] (arguing that the constitutional basis of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), is the Supremacy Clause because federal common law is not one of the three sources of supreme law); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245 (1996) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Common Law]; Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 327 (2001); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers]; Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 91 (2003); Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1161 (1998) [hereinafter Clark, Translating Federalism]; Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 319 (2003) [hereinafter Clark, Unitary Judicial Review] (interpreting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).